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Gender-Based Pay Gaps:   
Methodological and Policy Issues  
in University Salary Studies 
Myra Marx Ferree and Julia McQuillan 
University of Connecticut 
Abstract
Methodology is often a point of contention in gender-based salary studies. Al-
though this debate seems at first to be merely about technical issues, it also has 
an important conceptual dimension. We argue that there are two competing im-
plicit conceptions of discrimination, one institutional and the other individual, 
that underlie many such debates. We first contrast the preferred methodolo-
gies advanced by each side, the policy capturing approach and the flagging ap-
proach, and explore the theoretical meaning of their statistical models. We then 
describe a practical application of both methodological approaches in one spe-
cific salary inequity study. In conclusion, we reflect on the implications of such 
practical statistical choices, discuss how such models can be combined, and 
make suggestions for sociologists who act as statistical experts or work with 
them in gender-based salary inequity studies on their own campuses. 
Over 100 studies have evaluated possible gender-based discrimination in sal-
aries at academic institutions in the United States (Gray 1990; Haignere et al. 
1996; Scott 1977). There are generally two opposing sides interested in these 
discrimination studies, a faculty committee or union representing employees 
that believes gender-based discrimination exists, and an administration team 
that often believes none exists. A central issue for both sides involves the choice 
of method for determining the existence of a possible gender-based pay dif-
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ferential (summarized in Gray 1990). In this article, we argue that these meth-
odological debates have an important conceptual dimension. To illustrate our 
case, we draw on a salary study that was conducted at a state university medi-
cal and dental school. 
This salary study, like many nationwide, came into being as a result of dis-
cussions between faculty and administration. The school’s vice president estab-
lished a formal committee of women faculty and charged them with ascertain-
ing if gender-based inequality in pay existed at this institution. Both faculty and 
administration agreed from the start that the issue was inequity, or discrimina-
tion in the broad sense, whether or not it was actually illegal. The goals en-
dorsed by both faculty and administration were to discover if there was a prob-
lem in setting pay, whether conscious or unconscious, and if so, to remedy it. 
Later, disagreement arose between this committee and the administration over 
several specific aspects of the study, particularly the most appropriate meth-
odological approach for identifying the existence and nature of any such prob-
lem. We suggest that one underlying tension was between competing, largely 
implicit understandings of how pay inequities arise and consequently how re-
search should be appropriately designed to evaluate them. We refer to the two 
approaches as “institutional” and “individual.” 
The committee assumed a model of salary inequity that operates at the insti-
tutional level. The institutional approach conceptualizes wage discrimination 
as a gender stratification process that is not only historical but also pervasive 
and ongoing (Acker 1989; Clayton and Crosby 1992; Connell 1987). As a theory, 
the institutional approach assumes that salary setting processes for men in-
cumbents are the institutional norm, women having historically been excluded 
from the system and thus being “added in” after the fact. Paying women less in 
the same jobs was completely legal until only 30 years ago; when women were 
hired in conventionally men’s occupations, their wages as a class were system-
atically lower. The acceptability of paying women less remains an implicit so-
cial norm. Moreover, the institutional model sees all specific salary-paying or-
ganizations as being part of a labor market that as a whole still discriminates 
against women, leaving women in a less strong market position than men when 
negotiating salary with their organization, which can then benefit by continu-
ing to pay women less. An institutional model assumes that no individual prej-
udice or hostility by a supervisor to an individual woman employee is neces-
sary to pay her less, systematically, than a similarly skilled and experienced 
man in a comparable job (Deaux and Major 1987). 
Institutional inequity is often hard to see in everyday interactions. When 
something is institutionalized, it becomes part of the shared expectations about 
who deserves what and who should be responsible for specific positions. These 
shared expectations are eventually built into established patterns of behav-
ior; in other words, they become institutionalized as simply the way things are 
done (Benokraitis and Feagin 1995). No conspiracy or policy to pay women 
less is necessary. Identifying inequities at the institutional level requires under-
standing the salary setting process as it is applied to men in the organization 
as a whole and establishing if, when, and how women’s salaries as a group are 
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systematically set differently. Addressing institutionalized inequity involves 
taking proactive steps to change institutional culture and functioning. 
The administration appeared to us to assume a model of inequity that op-
erates at the individual level. This approach conceptualizes discrimination as 
the result of isolated prejudiced individuals in positions to decide salaries who 
deliberately choose to pay individual women less than they abstractly merit. 
In the vice president’s own words, he wanted to know, “Did I have a bad ac-
tor here? And if so, I wanted to get that person out of a leadership role.” In 
this conceptual schema, some percentage of the income the individual woman 
has earned is being arbitrarily withheld “just because she is a woman” by an 
individually prejudiced administrator or supervisor, the “bad actor” in the 
above quote. To model what an individual woman “really earned” while “re-
moving” her individual gender, this approach seeks to identify either an in-
dividual man or a group of men who are as close as possible to doing exactly 
what she does in as similar a setting as can be determined. Once the compa-
rable man or men can be found, a “true” value of her earnings can be esti-
mated and the extent of her underpayment, if any, measured. In general, the 
individual model assumes that such discrimination would be rare rather than 
systematic, being a reflection of individual prejudice (the “bad actor”) rather 
than of institutional functioning. 
The individual approach also reflects the managerial demands on adminis-
trators. As managers, higher-level administrators can more readily identify and 
sanction “bad judgment” by individual lower-level decision makers than ad-
dress the impact of widespread practices within the institution. Smaller, more 
internally homogeneous groups are also more comprehensible, and literally 
more “manageable” to administrators who have oversight over large, complex 
educational institutions. For those administrators who think of prejudice-and-
discrimination as a single phenomenon and are thus committed to an individ-
ual model at the conceptual level, to apply the institutional approach seems 
to suggest that they believe all of their subordinates are sexist. To them, the 
across-the-board remedy that the institutional model offers may seem like a 
“bad performance review” applied indiscriminately rather than to specific “bad 
actors.” As managers, they want to control decision making over issues like sal-
ary and to apportion rewards (raises) and blame (for biased decisions) selec-
tively. They also have incentives to keep the cost of any potential salary settle-
ment as low as possible. 
There have long been debates between these two models at the conceptual 
level (see, e.g., Gray 1993). Institutionalists argue for the importance of un-
derstanding sexism (and racism) in defining job queues for occupations (Re-
skin and Roos 1990), structuring patterns of power and influence in corpora-
tions (Cockburn 1991 ; Kanter 1977), and systematically influencing the wages 
and salaries thought to be appropriate for specific jobs and classes of workers 
(Acker 1989; Bielby and Baron 1986; Jacobs and Steinberg 1990). Defenders of 
letting market forces alone determine salaries see discrimination merely as an 
“imperfection” reflecting individuals who are prejudiced, and argue instead 
that most or all systematic differences reflect real differences in market value 
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between individuals’ human capital, productivity, or occupational supply and 
demand (e.g., Becker 1985; Filer 1983; Polachek 1985). Neoclassical economists 
often believe strongly that markets do eliminate discrimination in all but rare 
instances and are theoretically committed to the individual model. 
In this article, we take the conceptual debate and examine it at the level of 
social statistics and show how the choice of methodology in applied work on 
salary discrimination in academia reflects such theoretical positions, however 
poorly articulated they may be by the contending parties (cf. Blalock 1991). In 
doing so, we hope both to illuminate a struggle in which many of us, as aca-
demics, have a personal stake and to indicate the dangers and opportunities we 
have when we act as statistical experts in such controversies. 
In the first part of the article, we contrast the preferred methodologies ad-
vanced by each of the conceptual sides and explore the theoretical meaning of 
the two statistical models in the abstract. In the second part, we describe a prac-
tical application of both methodological approaches, by providing a case study 
of a salary equity study that illustrates the types of models and arguments 
used. We conclude with a section that raises some broader reflections on our 
experience and make practical suggestions for sociologists who are enlisted as 
“statistical experts” or who listen to such experts in gender-based salary stud-
ies on their own campuses. 
We offer the specific case study not as a “finding of discrimination,” but 
as an illustration of a collaborative process of addressing pay inequity.1 “Dis-
crimination” is a legal concept that is constructed by a changing constellation 
of state and federal laws and judicial interpretations. Had we been faced with 
the problem of advancing a statistical case through the courts, we would have 
had to tailor our presentation of evidence to the legal standards of “proof.” 
There are three legal standards for a finding of illegal discrimination. “Evil 
motive” demands direct evidence of discriminatory intent (which has become 
rare), and “disparate treatment” involves showing the application of differ-
ent standards of evaluation or reward to “similarly situated” individuals. The 
third, “disparate impact,” requires evidence that, although the same standard 
was applied to “members of a protected class” (those groups named in and 
covered by Title VII of the Civil Rights Act or another relevant piece of spe-
cific legislation) as to others, the impact of the standard used was dispropor-
tionately negative for members of the protected class and its use was not a 
business necessity. These legal standards of evidence should not be confused 
with deeper theoretical understandings of the operation of the processes that 
give rise to such evidence. When we speak of the institutional and individual 
model, we are referring to these underlying theoretical conceptualizations, not 
the evidence that courts might consider relevant to each legal standard. What 
the courts might see as disparate treatment by the organization as a whole 
(and respond to women as a group in a class-action suit) would be concep-
tualized here as an institutional model, while the adherents of the individual 
model would see disparate treatment only in the form of discriminatory out-
comes concentrated among certain individuals within the organization (not a 
class as a whole). 
Me t h o d o l o g i c a l a n d Po l i c y is s u e s  i n un i v e r s i t y sa l a r y st u d i e s    11
To date, U.S. appellate courts have not held that failure to pay equally for 
comparable work (rather than for identical work) constitutes illegal pay dis-
crimination (cf. England 1992, chap. 5). However, in the case we study, the state 
legislature had previously passed a law providing comparable worth settle-
ments to state employees when a joint union-management study identified pay 
inequities and developed a joint plan for redressing them. Because the faculty 
we study were not unionized, they did not fall directly under the provisions of 
the law, but both faculty and administration to some degree used the earlier 
comparable worth studies and settlements with unionized employees as guide-
lines for what the process in this case should be. The controversies that arose 
when re-applying the model developed for a unionized faculty to this new set-
ting clarified for us the differences in thinking about inequity that we are call-
ing the institutional and individual model. These two models are, of course, 
ideal types rather than rigid dichotomies. However, such underlying and im-
plicit theory helps to explain some of the ways in which methodological dis-
agreements are not just about statistical approaches. 
The Methodological Debate 
Some issues are, indeed, narrowly methodological. Multiple regression anal-
ysis is widely used for studying social inequality (see, e.g., Blalock 1991). Up to 
a certain point, both sides in salary discrimination disputes agree about this 
methodology: Each finds appropriate multiple regression models built on all 
available data that might “legitimately” predict salary. In typical academic sal-
ary studies, the administration and the complaining faculty group jointly des-
ignate a list of factors potentially relevant to salary for which data exist, among 
which are rank, department, time at the institution, and years since degree. In 
this list, both sides usually agree to include rank and department but not pro-
ductivity measures. These decisions put limits on the results, but they are prob-
ably necessary if the goal is to create usable models (Haignere et al. 1996; Stein-
berg and Haignere 1987). 
Rank can be problematic as a variable. On the one hand, it is necessary to in-
clude rank in a statistical model in order to ensure that differences in pay at-
tributable to women being more junior (in the sense of being better represented 
in more recent cohorts of PhDs and thus appropriately in lower rank) are not 
attributed to gender itself. On the other hand, rank and pay discrimination may 
be variably related to each other. In many institutions, rank is set by different 
decision makers than pay and including rank may be capturing various effects 
of promotion discrimination on women: Women’s pay may be unfairly low but 
not seen by the model as such if their experience and achievements go unrec-
ognized in both promotion and pay, or women’s pay may seem to be high for 
their rank if they get routine raises but are especially less likely to be promoted 
to a higher rank when their age and achievements would predict promotion 
(Gray 1990).2 In either case, these various effects of rank on pay by gender re-
quire a separate study of promotions, which we—like most institutions—did 
not have adequate data to conduct. Because we are focused only on salary ineq-
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uity, it is appropriate to include rank. However, including rank as a variable in 
the salary model produces conservative estimates of discrimination whatever 
specific regression model is employed (cf. Bellas 1994). 
“Productivity” is always a controversial element in such studies. The addi-
tional time, expense, and effort necessary to gather information about schol-
arly productivity, such as publications and research grants, is daunting in it-
self (and can be frequently used as an excuse for why no credible study can be 
done at all). Even if full vitae were available and coded, the challenge inherent 
in deciding the worth of different journals, books versus articles, and types and 
amounts of grants is contentious within departments and probably not feasible 
across specialties. Scholarship is also not the only type of productivity that is 
rewarded, and measures of teaching and service contributions are also poorly 
developed. Pilot studies by Gray and Scott (1980) on salary data suggest that 
the variables already typically included in the model capture much of the rela-
tionship between productivity and salary and that specific measures of produc-
tivity did not significantly improve their models. In any case, few administra-
tions have such data quantified, making the inclusion of a variable measuring 
productivity in either type of model moot. 
Finally, all regression models include some sort of control for departments 
or groups of departments. The size and composition of these groupings is of-
ten controversial, as we discuss below, because the grouping process inevita-
bly demands a judgment as to what academic work is “the same” or different. 
Departments themselves are not homogeneous in the type of work performed 
(e.g., qualitative sociology of the family or quantitative analysis of class strat-
ification), and similar specialties may be found in more than one department 
(e.g., social psychologists in both psychology and sociology departments). 
Grouping into categories larger than departments is usually necessary on 
pragmatic grounds, to avoid having no women at all in some categories or 
ranks (making it impossible to calculate one or more coefficients). At one ex-
treme, a comparable worth approach might argue that all faculty at an insti-
tution are doing comparable work and all groupings should be avoided lest 
the number of women in a group bring down the average pay for that group. 
At the other extreme, all groups might be resisted on the argument that every 
individual’s job is specifically different in training and market position, mak-
ing all statistical analysis a priori impossible. Other research has shown that 
the percentage of women in a department may depress salaries, but its effects 
as a variable also must be separated from the clustering effects that reflect 
market and human capital differences between departments (Bellas 1997). Be-
cause differences between departments or other groups (such as medical spe-
cialty) are known to be due not only to the numbers of women in them, ex-
cluding all such grouping would undermine the validity of the study. The 
specific nature of the groups constructed, as we will see below, reflects the 
theoretical approach taken. 
More than merely methodological disagreements arise in relation to the spe-
cific nature of the regression models preferred by each side. In these instances, 
the statistical disagreements are reflections of more fundamental assumptions 
Me t h o d o l o g i c a l a n d Po l i c y is s u e s  i n un i v e r s i t y sa l a r y st u d i e s    13
about the processes generating inequity. In the following sections we elabo-
rate the methodological and theoretical positions involved in advocating each 
model. 
The Institutional Model 
The institutional approach uses multiple regression in a way designed to 
detect a pattern of salary inequity at the institution as a whole (Ferree and 
Killeen, reported in Geetter 1988). The basic model is recommended by the 
American Association of University Professors (Gray 1990) and is also briefly 
described in Norusis (1988, 175). As we will explain below, the residuals of 
this regression approach can also be used to test the plausibility of the individ-
ual model. We call this in general the “policy-capturing approach.” This pol-
icy-capturing approach uses the shared list of salary-relevant factors to con-
struct the best-fitting regression possible to predict men’s salaries, taking the 
variation of residuals around the mean to reflect the influence of unmeasured 
variables (research productivity, impact as an undergraduate teacher, service 
and visibility on campus, administrative favoritism, and other unmeasured 
factors) on salary.3 Even with a well-fitting regression model (that is, one that 
explains 70-80 percent of the variance in men’s salaries), a considerable resid-
ual in dollar terms remains evident in the distribution of individual men’s re-
siduals around the men’s mean (which is, by the mathematics underlying re-
gression, always zero). 
When a policy-capturing regression is found that is the best-fitting and 
most appropriate model for men’s salaries, the regression coefficients thus ob-
tained are applied to the women’s data and used to predict women’s salaries. 
After fitting the women to the men’s model, the means and shapes of the re-
siduals obtained are then examined. The difference between the men’s mean 
(zero) and the women’s mean (positive or negative) indicates the gap between 
what women as a group are paid and what they would have if they received 
the same value as the men for their salary-relevant characteristics. In the insti-
tutional model, men constitute the “norm” in male-sex-typed occupations such 
as university professor. This does not mean that men’s salaries are “fair” in 
some absolute sense; historically gendered processes of salary setting no doubt 
inflated men’s salaries (by restricting competition, etc.) as well as suppressing 
those of women. As men still constitute the bulk of the faculty (in this case, 
71 percent), it makes theoretical sense from the perspective of this model to 
treat them as the institutional norm.4 Reversing the regression models—fitting 
men’s data to a women’s model—and comparing the resultant salary differen-
tial usefully indicates the magnitude of the interaction between membership 
in the group and rates of return to members of that group (Jones and Kelley 
1984). When there is no such interaction, the two models are equivalent and 
would yield the same results. When the rates of return differ and implicitly one 
prefers raising women’s rates of return to those typical of men, as in this case, 
Jones and Kelley argue (p. 340) that fitting women to the men’s model is more 
theoretically appropriate. 
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The institutional understanding of gender-based discrimination identi-
fies the salary gap found by fitting women to the men’s model as the amount 
of gender-based salary discrimination between women and men and, assum-
ing the value is negative and statistically significant, considers this the gender-
based pay gap. However, if the analysis stops at this point and only looks at 
the means, it may be seriously misleading. Such average differences do not tell 
the whole story. As Gray (1990) argues, it is very important to carefully exam-
ine the spread of the residuals. If the assumptions of multiple regression are 
met, the men’s residuals will be approximately normally distributed, spreading 
evenly above and below the average in a bell-shaped curve. Women’s residuals 
provide further, crucial information. 
One way to examine the merits of an institutional explanation of discrimi-
nation is by examining the shape of the women’s residuals. If the average dif-
ference between men’s and women’s residuals is explained by some individual 
women being grossly and unfairly underpaid—as the individual model sug-
gests would be the case—there will be a bimodal curve, with a second “hump” 
near the tail end of the negative residuals.5 Such a “hump” would represent 
a cluster of women with abnormally low salaries who pull down the average 
for the whole group, most of whom earn for their salary-relevant character-
istics about what men do (see Figure 1). Which particular women are part of 
the “cluster” that is experiencing discrimination and which women are part of 
the normally expected distribution of negative residuals cannot, of course, be 
deduced solely from the curve. Rather than identifying just those individual 
women who have exceptionally large negative residuals as the problem cases, 
however, the logic of the institutional model suggests looking for underlying 
patterns that may produce this clustering: Are women in the “hump” at the 
bottom, for example, disproportionately likely to be members of a certain de-
partment or school? If so, the possibility raised by the individual model that 
there is a “bad actor” or prejudiced administrator setting salaries in that de-
partment should not be discounted. But the women whose salaries should then 
come under closer scrutiny should also include those in that same school or de-
partment who may fall at the mean or above in the overall distribution of resid-
uals, since they might well deserve high positive residuals on the basis of their 
scholarly productivity or other unmeasured factors that were not being appro-
priately rewarded by the possibly prejudiced administrator. In some cases, a le-
gitimate factor may be recognized and added to the model (for example, the in-
teraction of having a certain type of specialty in a certain type of department) 
that would eliminate the clustering effect at the bottom. 
Another possible shape anomaly, one that indicates institutional discrimi-
natory practices, would be a “glass ceiling effect” (e.g., no high-end residual 
tail, or a sharply truncated one, for women). In this case, most women may be 
earning about what the men’s model would predict, given their characteristics, 
but the women “stars” would be receiving salaries like those of merely average 
performers rather than seeing their unmeasured high level of productivity (or 
other unmeasured but positively valued characteristics) translate into high re-
siduals in salary as these do for men (see Figure 2). Again, note that the residu-
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als will not serve to identify these underpaid individual “stars,” but rather sug-
gest the nature of the cases that merit special scrutiny or extra redress. Note 
that in each case, there is a rebuttable presumption that women and men do 
not systematically differ in these unmeasured characteristics; in other words, 
the other side may argue back that women do constitute a disproportionately 
large share of the “dead wood” in the institution (and hence belong in a clump 
at the bottom) or that women simply are not found among the “stars” at all. 
The residuals, however, may show neither a “negative hump” nor a “trun-
cated top” effect, and instead indicate a consistent negative shift in the salaries 
of all the women taken as a group relative to the group of men (see Figure 3). 
This model most closely reflects the expectations of the institutional discrimi-
nation model. Such a systematic shift downward between the men’s and wom-
en’s distributions could only be explained by productivity factors if one as-
sumes that across the entire range of individuals, women are less productive 
than men (e.g., women “stars” are less productive than men “stars,” “average” 
women less productive than “average” men, and women “dead wood” some-
how even more “dead”) (Haignere et al. 1996). 
While in the case of the “negative tailhump” or “truncated top” it can be 
argued that the women affected by discrimination are a subset of all women 
and need to be individually identified so that their distinctively depressed sal-
aries can be raised, in the case of a “consistent downward shift” it appears that 
all women are affected by institutional discrimination by an amount approx-
imately equal to the mean residual for the women. If gender does not inter-
act with any of the independent variables in the model, this amount should be 
the same as a regression coefficient for gender in a model that pools the men’s 
and women’s data. Hence, it is important to run a pooled model (combining 
the men’s and women’s data) with a variable for gender and compare the re-
gression coefficient for gender with the amount of the women’s mean residual 
when the men’s model is applied to the women’s data. This comparison, be-
tween the mean residual and the regression coefficient, is a global indication 
of interactions and another important clue to whether or not it is plausible that 
gender-based pay gaps are different among specific groups of women. If there 
is a difference, looking at possible interactions, say, between gender and rank, 
should be further explored. 
Assuming there is no indication of interactions in the comparison of the 
pooled model with that fitting women to the men’s model and that close exam-
ination of the pattern in the residuals also indicates that gender-based inequity 
is not concentrated on women of a particular type, there is strong statistical ev-
idence that thc wage gap applies to the class “women” as a whole. The appro-
priate remedy would thus be an across-the-board salary adjustment that would 
bring the mean residual of the women’s distribution up to that of the men (and 
move the rest of the bell curve of residuals accordingly). 
This type of redress seems inherently objectionable to the believers in the 
model of individual discrimination and managers who focus mostly on individ-
uals, because it applies to a class (all women) something that they believe should 
be appropriately given only to “deserving individuals,” that is, the individual 
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women who have been shown to be the victims of prejudiced administrators 
who have not given them the salary they “really earned.” Their objections are ar-
ticulated in the case they make for a “more individualized approach. 
The Individual Model 
The regression approach that reflects the individual model first constructs 
small groups of “similarly situated” women and men, usually in the same or 
similar departments, and then runs separate regressions for each such small 
group. This approach either estimates separate gender coefficients for each 
group or models men’s salaries first and then puts women in the regression. 
Because the groups are much smaller, the standard errors are typically larger, 
effects less likely to be statistically significant and the shape of the residuals 
not necessarily as normal (see, e.g., Holmes-Rovner et al. 1994). We call this the 
“flagging approach” because it aims to identify (“flag”) individuals rather than 
patterns.6 Indeed, looking for patterns in such small sets of residuals makes lit-
tle or no statistical sense. 
Instead, the individual approach tests whether gender effects are signifi-
cant and, if they are, then tries to estimate what an individual woman would 
be earning “if she were a man” in a particular group (assuming the rest of her 
characteristics, such as rank and tenure, remain unchanged), by treating her 
negative residual as evidence of the extent of “underpayment.” Then only the 
women with negative residuals greater than some arbitrary amount have their 
individual cases examined to see if such a negative residual is warranted or 
not, and only those women whose negative residuals are found to be “unjusti-
fied” by their work are slated to receive compensatory raises. One such study 
of compensation equity (Holmes-Rovner et al. 1994) created cohorts of men fac-
ulty for each woman in the population, averaged salaries within each cohort, 
and compared the women’s salaries with this average. They then looked for 
patterns of inequity within each rank, by noting the number above 4 percent, 
within 4 percent, and below 4 percent of the average for the men. They con-
sistently found negative residuals (considered underpayment) of women, with 
the exception of women full professors. 
The use of multiple regression on small groups to flag individuals with 
negative residuals fits with an understanding of discrimination as the result 
of prejudiced individuals.7 It assumes that such cases are relatively rare and 
should stand out statistically, even in regressions done with such small n’s that 
only the most dramatic effects reach statistical significance. It “finds” those in-
dividual women who are not paid at the level of their peers, clearly control-
ling for factors other than gender, such as type of work or specialty, that might 
explain differences in salaries, by looking for cases with more or less extreme 
negative residuals. This approach is intuitively appealing because it is a nice fit 
with how Americans generally think about salary discrimination, that is, as an 
isolated occurrence happening to a few unfortunate women. Seeking out those 
wronged, evaluating their situation, and remedying individual cases is a famil-
iar approach. 
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This approach may sometimes also rest on a different understanding of 
what makes “good science.” The analysis envisioned by the individual ap-
proach is similar to the case-matching approach in medical research, It at-
tempts to create conditions similar to true experiments by selecting cases such 
that everything but the effect of interest is “the same.” This approach defines 
gender as the only difference between the two “groups” or individuals, if and 
when they are “matched” on all other important factors (but see Campbell 
and Stanley 1963, 49, 70-71, for critiques of quasi-experimental matching de-
signs). Since productivity differences cannot be estimated as such, administra-
tors may decide that they can “adjust” for such factors based on their knowl-
edge of the individuals involved. Thus, conceptually, they imagine they are 
“looking at individuals” matched on particular characteristics, with “only 
gender” differing between them, rather than at the institutional patterns that 
gender, productivity, and other unmatched factors produce. This appeals to 
a sense of how “good science” is conducted, using an experimental model to 
define “science.” 
In sum, using the individual model of discrimination as a conceptual frame-
work, as administrators may be prone to do, the appropriate way to proceed is 
to create several small groups considered comparable for salary purposes, in-
terpret those women with negative residuals as underpaid, and rely on particu-
lar individuals designated as evaluators (usually administrators) personally to 
judge whether the underpayment is warranted or not. Although this approach 
has intuitive appeal, there are several problematic assumptions in this statisti-
cal approach. 
First, no individual woman who is earning a higher-than-typical salary for 
her measured characteristics is considered to be potentially underpaid, even 
though she may be a “star” performer (as some of the full professors in the 
Holmes-Rovner et al. study may have been). In other words, some women with 
positive residuals (e.g., one standard deviation above “average”) may merit 
even higher salaries (e.g., two or more standard deviations above the mean). 
Unlike men, who may receive exceptionally high salaries because of their un-
measured performance characteristics, women are assumed to deserve no more 
than average pay (but possibly less) than men of their cohort. As Gray and 
Scott (1980, 180) argue: 
If an examination may show that on a “quality” basis an individual 
woman “deserves” a salary which falls below the regression line, 
we must suppose—unless we assume that women are qualitatively 
inferior as a class—that on a “quality” basis some women deserve 
to receive salaries even further above the regression line than are 
their present salaries. 
By reviewing only women with negative residuals, it is impossible to iden-
tify women who have positive residuals but are underpaid given their individ-
ual, unmeasured characteristics (including productivity). These women may be 
outstanding in ways that deserve even higher salaries than the men in their 
group, but because they will not be flagged for review, this inequity will not be 
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detected. Analyzing only women with negative residuals assumes that women 
with positive residuals are “overpaid” and implies that an across-the-board 
settlement is unfair because they also receive an award. In other words, the ap-
proach assumes that women cannot deserve more than the average man within 
the small group in which comparisons are being made. Moreover, by focusing 
attention only on the lower half of the distribution, there is a risk of confirming 
possible prejudices that women are “less meritorious” generally (as the highly 
meritorious women with merely average salaries are exempted from adminis-
trative scrutiny). 
Second, the flagging approach confuses negative residuals in general with 
“underpayment” (which then is treated as either justified or not). We know 
from the assumptions of multiple regression that a normal curve of residu-
als, both positive and negative, is expected and appropriate. Looking at only 
women with negative residuals mistakes a characteristic of the institution 
(which should have a spread of salaries that reflects a spread of productivity-
based and arbitrary or chance variation in salaries) for a characteristic of an 
individual (defining a negative residual as a sign of a problematic underpay-
ment). A negative residual, like a positive residual, simply indicates that the 
model does not perfectly predict some salaries. Most salaries are close to accu-
rate (most cases fall within one standard deviation from the mean) and some 
are quite inaccurate (three standard deviations out in either direction). These 
inaccuracies—in either direction—may well be accounted for by unmeasured 
(productivity) characteristics, but unless one assumes that all women, at all per-
formance levels, are systematically inferior to men in these unmeasured char-
acteristics, the systematic negative shift found in the institutional model cannot 
be thus explained away. 
The confusion between negative residuals and underpayment is inherent 
in the small-group flagging approach because its small groups do not allow 
for meaningful patterns of residuals. The confusion may also arise if the “pol-
icy-capturing” regression for the institution as a whole is treated simply as 
generating negative residuals that are then used to “flag” individual women 
as underpaid. In the case of no discrimination, half of all women (like half of 
all men) should have negative residuals. Finding an extreme negative tail or 
hump pattern in the policy-capturing model is an indication of discrimina-
tion that more closely fits the individual model and should help to identify 
cases and conditions associated with “excess underpayment” concentrated in 
a specific subgroup, but the possibility that there are other members of that 
subgroup who are not in the tail or hump but no less underpaid should not 
be disregarded. 
When one focuses on the negative residuals alone (only one form of inaccu-
racy) and treats them as indicators of “underpayment” for women, the leap to 
considering them also as indicators of underpayment for men is not large. Be-
cause the individual model rests on regressions with small numbers of cases 
and uses them to find “potentially underpaid” women for individual scrutiny, 
two undesirable outcomes are encouraged: The women whose unmeasured 
characteristics tend to make them less valuable to the institution on average 
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will receive the bulk of the scrutiny (and most cases of “discrimination” will 
be found to be “justified”) and men who are also receiving below-average sala-
ries relative to their measured characteristics will be encouraged to claim they, 
too, deserve salary review and compensatory payments. Having thus pro-
voked them, the administration may feel it has little choice but to give “com-
pensation” to these men as well, thus eliminating the possibility that raises for 
women might actually mitigate the gender gap. 
Summary of the Two Models 
The model used for analysis (policy-capturing or flagging) is thus inextrica-
bly bound with the theory of discrimination used (institutional or individual) 
and the politics of redress (across-the-board or individual awards) preferred. 
As Gray and Scott (1980, 180) suggest, 
If a case-by-case analysis is to be used to discover factors not taken 
into account by the regression analysis, then obviously one has dis-
counted the notion of treating the discrimination on a class basis. 
… The appropriate remedy for statistically revealed discrimina-
tion is a statistical one; the regression line for women needs to be 
brought up to that for men. This means raising the salary of each 
woman, whether her current salary is above or below the regres-
sion line for men’s salaries. 
This approach, however statistically sound, remains unpalatable to those 
who refuse to consider institutional discrimination real and are committed to 
a search for individual acts of discrimination. When we consider how wide-
spread an individual understanding of discrimination is, it is not difficult to 
understand why an institutional approach might be ignored or rejected. In ad-
dition, academic administrators are managers of individuals and thus want to 
take the people involved into account in forming “qualitative” judgments and 
to exercise discretion and control over those whom they manage. However, 
given that considerable evidence suggests both types of discrimination oper-
ate in American society (see, for example, Benokraitis and Feagin 1995, for a re-
view), it is perilous to focus only on individuals. 
Given the politics of salary-setting, choosing between approaches on statis-
tical grounds alone will not work. The methods preferred by each side reflect 
their assumptions about how discrimination operates. Perhaps because most 
studies of this sort are applied evaluations, less attention is focused on assump-
tions and theory and more on the merits of statistical techniques (Gray 1993). 
However, arguing over what method should be used without addressing the 
theoretical assumptions of each results in both sides talking past each other. As 
we illustrate in the following case study, this conflict of perspectives is real and 
consequential in applied research on salary inequity. 
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Health Center Case Study 
In 1992 the authors were enlisted as statistical consultants for a committee of 
women faculty appointed by the administration at a university medical/den-
tal school (hereafter, Health Center) to determine if there were gender-based 
inequities in salaries.8 There had been two prior studies of women’s pay at the 
Health Center over the previous decade, each of which had found substan-
tial disparities, but both were statistically weak (primarily relying on ANOVA 
models with few control variables), and neither had had a practical outcome 
(Cipes 1983; Dadalt 1986). The women faculty on the main campus had won a 
salary adjustment of $1,800 per woman faculty member in 1988, and the Health 
Center faculty women considered that a study done with the same methodol-
ogy had a good chance of being accepted as a reasonable approach for their 
campus as well.9
The policy-capturing approach had been used on the main campus, and 
the committee suggested that we apply the same approach to the base sala-
ries of the Health Center faculty. The initial data were 1992 human resources 
payroll data for 535 faculty, 29 percent of whom were women and 90 percent 
of whom were white. Women faculty made up the majority of the instructors 
(60 percent of 55), close to half of the assistant professors (41 percent of 233), 
but few of the associate (15 percent of 102) or full (8 percent of 125) profes-
sors. Of 19 department heads, only 1 was a woman. Women were least likely 
to be in the dental department group (4 percent of 24) and surgery (19 per-
cent of 35), and most likely to be in pediatrics (45 percent of 53) and at off-site 
locations (39 percent of 33). Of the 161 faculty in basic science departments, 
28 percent were women, compared to 30 percent of the 373 faculty in clini-
cal departments. Women were, on average, younger (41 vs. 46 years for men), 
likely to have less time at the institution (6 vs. 9 years), likely to have earned 
their degrees more recently (13 vs. 18 years ago), and likely to have salaried 
employment at the Health Center represent a lower percentage of their time 
(82 percent vs. 88 percent). 
At the time the study began, the mean difference between men’s and wom-
en’s average base salaries was $28,500. By mutual agreement between the fac-
ulty committee and the administration, all clinical bonuses (analogous to 
profit-sharing), research assistants and associates, medical and dental resi-
dents, visiting faculty, and “superstars” (men with salaries that were more than 
six standard deviations from the mean) were excluded from the analysis. As 
with the decision to include rank in the model, these constraints also tend to 
make any estimates of gender-based inequities conservative (low). All base sal-
aries as of June 26, 1992, for the 1992-1993 academic year were expressed as 
12-month salaries. Because variation in salaries in such a narrow occupational-
institutional context is much smaller and less skewed than in the general pop-
ulation, we concluded that converting salaries to logarithms offered more cost 
in loss of ready interpretability than it was worth. All effects are thus expressed 
in dollars.10 
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The policy-capturing regression model (Table 1) gives the estimated effect 
in dollars of a particular characteristic (e.g., academic degree) while controlling 
for all other characteristics (e.g., rank) for men only. Gender is not included in 
the regression as a variable because this approach examines gender by bringing 
women into the men’s model. Variation around the mean in the men’s model is 
expected; it reflects the unmeasured productivity factors that also produce le-
Table 1: Policy-Capturing Model: Multiple Regression Predicting Male Faculty 
Salaries, 1992 
Departments                   B (dollars)                    SE B                        Beta 
Administration  22,518* 9,724 .0709
Offsite  –4,740 5,664 –.0248
Community  10,880 6,260 .0595
Psychiatry  2,924 5,367 .0163
Dental clinical  12,651 7,086 .0707
Pediatric  –5,001 4,920 –.0311
Diagnostics  12,955* 4,293 .1026
Basic science  5,437 5,494 .0458
Surgery  40,070* 3,619 .3718
Degrees    
Mixed  –31,212* 13,099 –.0647 
Masters  –28,755* 8,712 –.0967 
PhD  –26,069* 4,408 –.2820 
Dental  –41,700* 4,928 –.3216
Type    
Basic  –27,672* 4,822 –.2986
Tenure    
Not yet  2,412 4,209 .0175
Tenured  7,994 4,139 .0893
Additional variables    
Years at the institution  –497* 231 –.0794
Time since degree  778* 392 .1820
Percentage employed  342* 47 .2170 
Age  123 405 .0270 
Asian  –8,351 7,232 –.0313
Former administrator  33,213* 7,739 .1183
Rank    
Associate  11,290* 3,445 .1111
Professor  27,930* 4,653 .3006
Department head  58,010* 6,940 .2887
Dean  44,412 25,331 .0533
Constant  48,482* 5,775 
R2  .764  
Adjusted R2 .75  
The comparison group for department is medicine; for degree it is M.D.; for appointment 
type it is clinical; for tenure track it is in-residence; for racial/ethnic group it is white, black, 
Hispanic, and other; for rank it is instructors/assistants. The dependent variable is 1992 
salary. 
* p < .05 
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gitimate salary differences.11 The variables include department group (see be-
low), degree, rank, tenure, type of appointment (basic science or clinical), age, 
race, and present and past administrative responsibility. The coefficients from 
the regression equation can be interpreted as the “worth” of various character-
istics, such as department or degree. 
Because there were over 40 departments on the payroll system, it was nec-
essary to group departments for the analysis. The committee combined de-
partments considered to have similar types of activities (see Table 2). Since the 
model already directly included as variables the type of degree, clinical versus 
basic science appointment, and rank, department groupings provided an ad-
ditional level of information about salary setting. Theoretically this grouping 
accepted broad market forces as legitimate salary setting factors, even though 
markets may be biased against fields with a higher proportion of women (cf. 
Bellas 1997).12 
The 1992 data were flawed and each year after 1992 the data were improved 
(errors were detected and corrected) and additional refinements were added. 
Unfortunately, we had no way to clean the 1992 data in 1996 because over 100 
people were no longer at the institution. Therefore, the model presented here is 
not the best possible model, but is the historical model presented to the faculty. 
It should be used as an example of how to proceed with this type of analysis, 
not as providing a specific “finding.” 
Once the men’s model was established, it was applied to the women’s data 
to ascertain the fit using residual analysis (comparing predicted salaries to ac-
tual salaries). A model was also constructed using the women’s salary data, 
Table 2. Departmental Groupings for the Original Committee Model 
Variable                 Group Name                 Departments 
Pedidept  Pediatrics  Pediatrics, Pediatric Module, Pediatric Dentistry,  and   
          Orthodontics 
Dentdept Dental clinical  Periodontics, Prosthodontics, Restorative Dentistry/ 
      Endodontics 
Psychdpt  Psychiatry  Psychiatry 
Surgdept  All surgical  Anesthesiology, Obstetrics/Gynecology, Oral Surgery, 
      Orthopaedic Surgery, surgery 
Medicine  Medicine  Medicine, Neurology, Student Health, Travelers  
      Center on Aging 
Diagdept  Diagnostics  Laboratory Medicine, Nuclear Medicine, Oral  
      Diagnosis, Pathology, Radiology 
Sciedept  Science  Anatomy, Biochemistry, Biostructure and Function,   
         departments      Microbiology, Physiology, Pharmacology 
Commdept  Community  Behavioral Sciences and Community Medicine, 
     departments      Community Medicine 
Offsite  Offsite clinical  Family Medicine, Burgdorf, CRMHC 
Admindept  Administration  Dental Dean, Student Affairs-Dental, Dean’s Office-
      Medical, Academic Affairs-Medical, Minority  
      Student Affairs 
Source: Gronowicz et al. (1993). 
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and then the coefficients were applied to the men’s data in order to rule out the 
possibility of a negative mean residual for men (Gray 1990). The men’s resid-
ual was positive, and over $9,000. As Jones and Kelley (1984) discuss, this dif-
ference in estimate of the size of the wage gap reflects how the interaction be-
tween the effect of gender per se and the effects of gender differences in the 
slopes (coefficients) for the individual variables (overall differences in rate of 
return) is treated. In the case of such differences in slope, they argue, the most 
appropriate model uses men as the norm.13 
As Table 3 shows, when women are put in the men’s model, the average 
residual for the women faculty was –$4,731. Eighty-three percent of the gross 
wage difference, or $23,786, was explained by the characteristics included in 
the policy-capturing model and thus treated as “legitimate.”14 The most im-
portant predictor variables included being a former administrator, rank, per-
centage employed, years at the institution and years since degree, type of ap-
pointment (basic or clinical), type of degree, and appointments to three of the 
departments (administration, diagnostics, and surgery). The model explained 
76 percent of the variation in men’s salaries (R2 = .764).15
Table 3a. Example Mean Salary Information 
                                                                          Salary Predicted by 
                                    Actual Salary                   Characteristics            Unexplained Difference 
Men  98,224  98,224  0 
Women  69,708  74,438  –4,731 
Difference  28,516  23,786  –4,731 
Mean salary, mean salary predicted by characteristics, remaining unexplained difference 
between men and women’s salaries, 1992 faculty. 
Table 3b. Example Residual Statistics 
                                                                                                                                        Standard 
                                                      Minimum       Maximum                  Mean          Deviation 
Men 
Predicted salary  26,738.0  209,653.0  98,224  37,356 
Residual  -70,537.0  83,869.0  0  20,761 
Standardized residual  -3.38  3.9  -.0002  .9993 
Total cases = 380 
Women 
Predicted salary  9,871  145,113  74,438  30,882 
Residual  -68,881  60,594  –4,731  20,735 
Standardized residual  -3.2  2.8 -.22   0.96 
Total cases = 155 
Multiple R for women = .76 (R2 = .58) 
Multiple R for men = .87 (R2 = .76) 
Residual statistics for men and women from the regression of men’s faculty salaries on the 
salary-setting characteristics. 
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Despite the systematic downward shift of –$4,731, the residuals for the 
model applied to the women’s data are approximately normally distributed, 
as are the men’s (although the men’s distribution is not quite normal, being 
particularly narrow and tall, that is, leptokurtic). Based on the values for the 
measured characteristics, only 40 percent of women earn more than predicted 
and 60 percent earn less (see Figure 4). No second hump or long tail at the bot-
tom is to be seen, providing no evidence of an especially discriminated against 
group of women bringing down the average. There may be some indication 
of a glass-ceiling effect, suggesting a special need for concern about high-per-
forming women. However, there is no evidence that gender significantly inter-
acts with the variables in the model; when the same regression is run on all of 
the faculty data simultaneously and a dummy variable for gender included, the 
coefficient for women faculty is essentially the same –$4,683. This method also 
establishes a significance level for the effect of gender (p = .04), as Ikeda (1995) 
and Hauser and Mason (1993) suggest.16 
The Working Group on the Status of Women Faculty reported the results of 
the study to the administration along with its recommendation that all wom-
en’s salaries be raised by $4,731. The administration challenged the study on 
the basis of errors in the data and the type of analysis and pressed for an anal-
ysis of small market-based groups of faculty, with most of the same variables 
controlled. The stated goal of the new analysis was to look for women who 
were negative outliers (i.e., had large negative residuals) and to rectify errors 
in the data. Concerns about particular women who fit the model poorly, ob-
jections to being given a solution, and unfamiliarity with the analytic strategy 
added to their desire for a new approach. 
A series of negotiations ensued about the appropriate variables to include in 
the model, groups that should be excluded, additional data cleaning, and differ-
ent clusterings of departments. The primary sticking point was the administra-
tion’s desire to identify specific women who might be “underpaid” (i.e., “flag-
ging” particular women with negative residuals). There was no objection to 
re-running the basic model with some adjustments suggested by the adminis-
tration. The addition of an interaction term for individuals in the surgery de-
partment without an MD degree did improve the model. In addition, removing 
various groups, such as faculty at off-site locations, made the sample more ho-
mogeneous and increased the R2. None of the changes suggested by the adminis-
tration, however, reduced the average gap between men’s and women’s salaries 
below –$4,000. Some of the changes increased the gap to as much as –$6,000. 
The administration did not accept the committee model. Their concerns fo-
cused on the accuracy of the human resources data, the exhaustiveness and ac-
curacy of the variables in the model, and the correct people to include in the 
analysis (groups to include or exclude). They requested a type of comparative 
analysis of individuals in groups and refused to accept the across-the-board 
settlement. We interpret the administration’s commitment to a “flagging” ap-
proach to find possible individuals who might be unfairly underpaid as a result 
of an individual understanding of discrimination. No progress on an across-
the-board settlement was made in academic year 1992-93. 
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In academic year 1993-94 the administration requested a new set of analy-
ses to identify individual women who might have unfairly low salaries. Part 
of the argument advanced for this approach was that women who are “ade-
quately compensated” should not receive raises, and some women who are 
not adequately compensated deserve more than the proposed $4,731. The ad-
ministration took an active role in the continued analysis. The departmental 
groupings were revised based on assumed market value criteria rather than 
on the task similarity criteria used in the original model. Separate regression 
models were run for each group with the explicit goal of identifying individ-
ual women who might be underpaid relative to comparable men, according 
to a Holmes-Rovner et al. (1994) type model. This “searching for individuals” 
approach was consistent with the individual prejudice conception of how dis-
crimination operates, but it also reflected a laudable desire to “look closely at 
the data.” By looking at faculty in groups assumed to have similar character-
istics that determine pay, it was possible to directly see who was being com-
pared to whom.17
Despite our objection to defining cases with negative residuals as under-
paid individuals, with the advice and consent of the faculty committee, we 
accepted the administration’s request for further analysis. Although through-
out the study we were technically hired by the administration, we had pri-
marily worked with the committee (also appointed by the administration). At 
this point the administration took on a more active role. We ran the requested 
regressions on the small groups of faculty and flagged women whose resid-
uals were greater than one standard deviation below the mean (an arbitrary 
cut point). Models were run for separate groups created by the administra-
tion. These were (1) basic scientists in basic departments, (2) basic scientists in 
clinical departments, (3) administrators, and (4) five groups of clinical scien-
tists in clinical departments (clustered by specialty). Table 4 provides a sum-
mary of these results. In effect, these eight groups take the place of the ten de-
partment groups in the first institution-wide analysis, but the regressions are 
run on each subgroup separately, making the number of cases too small for a 
meaningful analysis of the residuals. As a cross-check, after analyzing these 
separate groups for women outliers, we re-ran the institutional model substi-
tuting dummy variables for these new market-based groups for the previous 
task-based department group dummy variables. This approach did not im-
prove the fit of the model (R2); when applied to 1993-94 data, it also did not 
significantly reduce the size of the pay gap between men and women. This in-
terchangeability of the statistics as such should emphasize the extent to which 
the preference for a type of model reflected an underlying difference in focus 
of concern: the small group approach turns attention away from looking for 
patterns in the residuals and toward equating negative residuals with pos-
sible inequity. Throughout the process, the models were frequently re-esti-
mated as individuals came and left the institution, as individual women re-
ceived salary adjustments, or as new groups were considered ineligible and 
were excluded, but the size of the overall gap in the institutional model re-
mained the same. 
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This modeling process had an interesting effect. It appeared to us that the 
administration became even more familiar with the details of how salaries were 
set by investigating the circumstances of women who were negative outliers in 
the small groups. Low salaries in some departments for some individuals be-
came a concern. As a result, there was a recommendation to the board of trust-
ees that the board develop some salary-setting guidelines, “without limiting 
their freedom to reward excellence and recruit and keep top scholars.” More-
over, the administration has now set up a biennial salary review to ensure that 
gender-based differences do not creep back into the system. While applauding 
these steps to improve gender salary equity at the institution, we continued to 
emphasize the lack of concern this individual approach showed to women who 
were “top scholars” and underrewarded their productivity (despite their pos-
itive residuals). As of 1997, there were some indications that even these issues 
might be addressed in a follow-up study. 
In June of 1994, the administration increased the women faculty’s pay 
across the board by $1,000 (or a prorated equivalent for part-time workers). 
This increase was announced as a sign of good faith that an institution-wide 
problem “may exist.” The institutional and individual models were then reap-
plied to salaries after the June increases. Despite the limitations of the admin-
istration’s flagging model, primarily that underpayment was equated with 
negative residuals and only women with negative residuals were reviewed, it 
did generate evidence that some of the women reviewed still had salaries sig-
nificantly lower than their peers. There were women who appeared grossly 
underpaid when compared to men with similar characteristics and work sit-
uations. This was now considered convincing evidence of unfairness, both 
by the administration and by the predominantly male faculty councils of the 
medical and dental schools, which in fall 1994 set up a joint committee to con-
Table 4. Results of the Small Group Analysis (individual) Compared to the Pol-
icy-Capturing Model (institutional) with 1994 Data 
Model                                   Men N       Women N     Adjusted R2    Mean Residual             p 
Basic in basic  72  17  .82  –2,836  .23 
Basic in clinical  37  22  .71  –2,983  .43 
Clinical in clinical #1  82  35  .66  –3,403  .25 
Clinical in clinical #2  33  16  .54  –9,852  .15 
Clinical in clinical #3  38  6  .35  –14,783  .5 
Clinical in clinical #4  7  1  .96  7,377 —
Clinical in clinical #5  38  4  .94  343  .95 
Deans/administrators  14  3  .32  –1,718  .95 
Institutional model  342 120  .75 –1,052  .64 
Clinical #1: General Pediatrics, General Medicine, Neurology, Family Medicine, Psychiatry. 
Clinical #2: Laboratory Medicine, Pathology, GI Medicine, Neonatology, Dermatology, Car-
diology, Emergency Medicine. Clinical #3: OBGYN, general surgery, Urology, ENT, Nu-
clear Medicine, Radiology, Anesthesiology. Clinical #4: Neurosurgery, Orthopedics. Clini-
cal #5: all Clinical Dentistry. 
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tinue to improve the analysis and to monitor “progress toward resolution” 
of the inequities. Additional salary awards were made to individuals in the 
1994-95 academic year. 
The joint council made an additional contribution to the analysis, mov-
ing it further away from the comparable worth precedent it had originally 
followed. Instead of grouping departments and specialties according to as-
sumed market values, they used published salary statistics for specialties in 
order to make empirically sound market-value-based groups (described in Ja-
cob et al. 1996). Such purely market-based groupings automatically erase any 
evidence of society-wide discrimination that takes the form of underreward-
ing women in specialties with high proportions of women (cf. Bellas 1997). 
The remaining analyses, both institutional and individual, were conducted 
using these new groupings.18
The joint council salary review committee—consisting of two men and two 
women representing the medical and dental schools, clinical and basic science 
faculty—reported in February of 1996 that as a result of review by the admin-
istration and the committee, “28 percent of the full-time women faculty sala-
ries were identified as outliers, reviewed, and 22 percent were adjusted. Addi-
tionally, an undetermined number of women received equity increases July 1, 
1995 in addition to the cost-of-living increase received by most faculty” (Jacob 
et al. 1996, 4).19 Indeed, both the institutional model and the small group anal-
ysis were conducted on newer data (1995 salary data), after both the $1,000 
raise had been applied and the additional salary increases given to individual 
women who were seen by the administration as underpaid. In the 1995 insti-
tutional models, after these salary adjustments were made, the gender gap is 
reduced to about $1,000 and is no longer significant statistically. The small 
group analyses also now showed no systematic gender bias remaining for 
any group, with all t tests showing no significant differences (Table 4). How-
ever, this type of analysis, relying on negative residuals only, could not de-
tect if any of the women with positive residuals were also underpaid, because 
none were flagged for review. 
Discussion 
Rather than reaching a stalemate over incompatible methodologies, in this 
particular case, a compromise process was found that allowed both sides to 
claim victory. On the one hand, the women faculty all received at least a to-
ken award of $1,000 and some women faculty received substantial salary ad-
justments, which was a breakthrough after years of discontent and unsuc-
cessful claims for change. After several years of negotiations and individual 
wage adjustments, there was no longer a statistically significant difference be-
tween men’s and women’s average salaries. On the other hand, the adminis-
tration succeeded in having its individualized approach to identifying pay in-
equity adopted, and so kept the responsibility for making any salary changes 
within the discretion of the administrators themselves. Since the actual award 
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amounts remained confidential, the ability of the faculty to see how arbitrary or 
well-founded these decisions were was quite limited. 
In some respects, both sides moved toward each other over the course of 
the negotiations. While the committee and the administration continued to dis-
agree with respect to theoretical approach (and consequently statistical mod-
els), there was considerable evidence of the administration’s increased com-
mitment to identifying and eliminating gender-based salary inequity. The 
administration took several steps to redress identified inequities, including 
across-the-board compensation, individual settlements, the joint council moni-
toring committee, and the recommendation to the trustees regarding salary set-
ting guidelines. The committee allowed more individuals to be excluded from 
the model (e.g., those in off-site positions) and shifted gradually from task-
based to market-value-based definitions of similarity, accepting society-wide 
structural arrangements that may disadvantage women. 
A shared victory can be noted as well: Monitoring pay in and of itself can 
promote more equity. Several of the faculty committee members provided an-
ecdotal evidence of increased awareness of and decreased tolerance for gen-
der differences in salaries over the four years of studies. It is also clear that 
studies alone do not bring change. We suspect, but have no systematic evi-
dence for this suspicion, that the involvement of several prominent women 
faculty and their reports to both the dental and medical school faculty coun-
cils contributed more to a changing climate than the studies themselves. Ma-
jor’s (1987) work on gender and entitlement suggests that making male pay 
norms highly visible can produce discontent and pressure for action from 
women. The steady persistence of the committee members kept the issue on 
the agenda and, we suspect, contributed to the actions taken in response to 
the study. 
Application of the theoretical models of individual or institutional discrim-
ination to the arguments and policy preferences of the administration and the 
women’s faculty committee helped us as outside statistical experts to reach a 
resolution in this case. Despite our misgivings about the theory and methods 
preferred by the administration, we chose to run the administration’s mod-
els for them as well (with the full knowledge and consent of the faculty com-
mittee). At first, we were surprised that our argument for an across-the-board 
settlement—that it would be fairer to the best women on the faculty—was re-
jected. Ultimately, we imputed this resistance to both the administration’s tacit 
view of discrimination as an individual process and their desire to keep salary 
information and decisions in their own hands. We concluded that if adequately 
rewarding all women, including the ones who are “twice as good as men,” de-
mands rethinking basic institutional practices, many administrators may be un-
willing to consider such a change. As Gray (1990) suggests, people who use sta-
tistics cannot always “hear what statistics have to tell.” 
Our experience in this particular case study of salary inequity, as well as our 
general analysis of the competing models of discrimination likely to be held 
by each side, leads us to some general conclusions and caveats about the pro-
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cess of analyzing discrimination with the goal of making and supporting sound 
claims for gender-based salary adjustments. 
First, we think that women faculty and administrators should be aware 
of the implicit model of inequity processes that they hold and thus also con-
sider the type of statistical evidence that they will accept as appropriate. We 
are especially concerned that many women faculty seem to accept the defini-
tion of a negative residual as “underpayment.” Committees that take (or ac-
cept) this approach disregard the potentially underpaid women “stars” even as 
they encourage men with negative residuals to define themselves also as “un-
derpaid.” Highlighting cases with negative residuals puts the spotlight on the 
women and men who are more likely than most to have lower values on the 
unmeasured productivity variables. This inadvertently sets up the study to en-
counter a maximum of political backlash, since a focus on the low end of the 
distribution risks both confirming stereotypes about women as low perform-
ers and stirring up resentment among men who feel it unjust for any “compa-
rable” woman to be earning more than they do. Flagging (and trying to con-
test “justifications for”) some women’s low salaries also does not even begin to 
address the “glass ceiling” for women achievers. When gaining and maintain-
ing the strong support of the most respected women faculty on campus may 
be key for reaching a resolution politically, disregarding the pay problems that 
can affect “above average” women is strategically unwise as well as theoreti-
cally unsound. 
Theoretically, we think that salary equity committees should consider not 
just the main effects for gender but also the shape of the residuals as important 
clues to processes of individual and institutional discrimination for women at 
all salary levels. We do not doubt that there are instances where concentrated 
animosity toward women may lead to a cluster of especially underpaid women 
at the bottom (evidenced in the long negative “tail” or second “hump” in the 
distribution), but unspoken norms about women not earning more than men 
of their cohort may also produce a “truncated top” that holds back the sala-
ries of the women who excel. It is a pattern of negative residuals, not the nega-
tive residual of any individual, that should guide a committee’s interpretation 
of inequity. If such a pattern is found, then the committee should be attentive 
to individual cases that may represent inequitable pay but appear anywhere in 
the distribution. For example, if there is a prejudiced administrator in a specific 
department, the exceptionally low salaries of some women in that department 
should trigger a review of all women’s salaries in that department, not just of 
the ones that show exceptionally large negative residuals. 
Second, we encourage applied researchers to be aware of and explicit about 
the theory—and the politics—of the models they employ (cf. Acker 1989; Stein-
berg 1995). The power that administrators hold over salary setting, especially 
on nonunion campuses, means that the administration’s conception of discrim-
ination is often definitive. It may be necessary to provide evidence that is struc-
tured to fit in their implicit model in order to create any acknowledgment that 
“a problem” may exist. Making compromises to meet their concerns can lead to 
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a more satisfactory outcome over the long run. In our case study, a “quick vic-
tory” in the form of an across-the-board increase might not have had the con-
sciousness and policy-changing effects in both faculty and administration that 
a longer negotiating process produced. Indeed, on the unionized campus that 
provided the initial model for our study, the salary awards were made with-
out fanfare and salary setting continued as usual. Despite the across-the-board 
awards that were won in 1988, it would not surprise us to find salary inequities 
there again in 1998. Paradoxically, institutional change may demand engage-
ment with just those administrators who do not hold an institutional model of 
discrimination processes. 
Understanding the administration’s perspective helped to reach such a long-
term resolution. Administrators who think discrimination is rare may be more 
concerned that an across-the-board settlement will “unfairly reward” a woman 
who happens not to be underpaid (Type II error) than that their focus on “flag-
ging” negative residuals will miss correcting problems for women who have 
smaller-than-appropriate positive residuals (Type I error). Administrators’ def-
inition of the relative importance of Type I versus Type II error is theoretical 
rather than empirical, resting at its root on a conviction that salary discrimina-
tion is rare rather than typical. Extensively working with the administration on 
a great number of individual “flagging” models may help to make discrimina-
tion seem less rare and contribute to their willingness to consider across-the-
board increases (as it did in our case study). 
Concern about giving “undeserved” increases to women may also reflect a 
more deeply felt concern about an “unjust advantage” for women than for the 
“unjust advantages” of men over the years. Haignere et al. (1996, 88) recount a 
case in which, as a result of a salary settlement, a woman was to receive $300 
more per year than a man who was admittedly her equal: this was felt as a 
gross injustice. The underpayment she had faced over the previous six years 
was $7,800. At that rate, however, the advantage would have to persist for 26 
years for her to simply earn back the amount she had been underpaid. Greater 
concern with women earning more than men than the reverse represents ex-
actly the sort of “built-in bias” in the system that the concept of institutional 
discrimination was created to cover (Major 1989). Trying to eliminate institu-
tional discrimination in salary-setting means confronting such “nonhostile” bi-
ases against women, which may demand campus-wide discussions. 
Making clear the implicit theories of discrimination operating on both sides 
of the negotiating process can improve understanding and appreciation for the 
opposing statistical approaches, and this in turn may help reach a resolution. 
While the administration may not be willing to change its model, the women 
faculty may be less easily diverted to “fixing” just a few individuals and the 
men faculty may be more willing to support them over what is likely to be a 
lengthy struggle. Statistical experts should not attempt to fool their clients (or 
themselves) into thinking that theirs is an atheoretical effort to merely find 
the best-fitting regression model, but they should show how both types of ap-
proaches to even the same regression are tests of theory. The applied researcher 
thus can (and under some circumstances, should) test both competing theories 
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and try to explain the strengths and weaknesses of each, including the implica-
tions of institutional analysis for remedies. 
On one hand, using the institutional approach makes it possible to show 
when discrimination is a systematic pattern and allows for exploration of what 
kind of pattern it is by examining main effects, interactions, and residuals. The 
policy-capturing approach itself can increase administrators’ awareness of how 
much certain factors contribute to basic salary-setting decisions and can lead 
to efforts to make policy more explicit and more fair in principle. On the other 
hand, using the flagging approach can confront administrators with evidence 
they find compelling about some individual women, including some instances 
of gross underpayment well in excess of institutional patterns. In addition, by 
focusing attention on the small groups in which salaries are actually negoti-
ated, the model may lead administrators to reflect more on how salaries are 
bargained and be more aware of the need for clearer and more uniform salary-
setting policies at the institution. 
Overall, we think that looking at institutional as well as individual patterns 
of discrimination is useful in achieving more than short-term salary adjust-
ments. If the pattern of women’s underpayment is not going to simply be rees-
tablished by a return to ordinary, nonhostile practices with discriminatory ef-
fect, these practices will need to be identified and discussed institutionally. For 
example, the common institutional practice of expecting talented high achiev-
ers to get competing outside offers to demonstrate their value to their home in-
stitution may disadvantage women in that they are more likely than men on 
the faculty to be married to another faculty member and thus less credible as 
seriously contemplating a move, making it harder to get outside offers and less 
likely that such offers will be aggressively matched (Haignere et al. 1996). Such 
“business-as-usual” approaches simply retain the organizational norms con-
structed based on professional men’s life patterns of the 1950s (Acker 1989). 
Taking both types of statistical models to their limits may push both parties 
to begin to discuss such assumptions and identify the problems both types of 
discrimination may cause. Even this, however, still leaves a distance to go in 
constructing the political dialogue that will enable academic institutions to ac-
knowledge and overcome their biases. 
Notes 
1. The empirical model presented here has many limits, and is not offered as evidence of 
discrimination, whether illegal or not. The analysis only provides an example of what the 
model and the output might look like using this approach. 
2. Pay and promotion reflect different institutional processes. They are often set by different 
decision makers (in the case of promotion, the support of the full professors of the depart-
ment may be required, while pay increases may be given by department heads, deans, or 
higher administrators), using different criteria (the “merit” assessed for pay may more 
readily include administrative service or teaching, while promotion may focus narrowly 
on scholarship), and standards of fairness (raises may reflect ideas about inflation, family 
size, or income demands while promotions do not). Thus it should not be surprising that 
discrimination in each might vary independently. 
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3. In regressions, the residual is the difference between the actual and the predicted salary. 
In sample-based studies, such residuals also represent sampling error. Since salary stud-
ies use a full population rather than a sample, the residual is unexplained variance that 
represents some real but unmeasured process by which salaries are set, even if it is sheer 
caprice (chance). 
4. Following this logic, the institutional norm for female-sex-typed occupations would be 
the women’s salaries, and in these instances the men’s data should be fitted to the wom-
en’s model. 
5. This could also appear as a clustering of women just at the most extreme low end of the 
distribution, producing a long “tail” there, if all the affected women were very extremely 
underpaid. It is more likely, however, that the center of the separate distribution of “un-
derpaid women” falls somewhere above the lowest point of the distribution of “fairly 
paid women” even when there are two separate underlying distributions so that the two 
groups cannot be separated by statistical means alone. The overlap of the two underlying 
distributions is what generates the observed bimodality. 
6. At its worst extreme, this approach eschews statistics entirely, selecting one individual 
“similarly situated” man to compare to each woman. 
7. Unfortunately, some of those who adopt the institutional approach also fall into the trap 
of confusing the negative residual itself with “underpayment” and simply interpret a re-
gression performed on the entire institution in the same way we discuss for the small 
group regressions. It is no less a problem in this instance. 
8. To be precise, the second author was hired and the administration paid her very modest 
consulting fees. 
9. This study, briefly described in Geetter (1988), was conducted by a joint administra-
tion-union team as mandated in the previous collective bargaining contract. There had 
been nearly a decade of negotiations (between women faculty and the union, between 
the union and the administration, and between the statewide coalition of state employee 
unions and the state legislature) that made possible both the study and its relatively rapid 
translation into salary inequity awards. 
10. Using logs lessens the gap between the mean and the high end of the distribution and is 
often warranted when distributions are very skewed, with a long high-end tail. But in this 
instance, the “superstars” who formed the high-end tail were removed and the remaining 
distribution not particularly skewed. 
11. Measurement error in the independent variables can also contribute to the spread of 
the residuals, but most of the variables in this model are relatively straightforward (sim-
ilar to demographic indicators), such as age, department, rank, type of appointment, and 
so forth, which tend to have less measurement error than indicators of more abstract con-
structs. “Error” in the dependent variable is not measurement error (the measured sala-
ries represent what base pay the faculty actually received) but may represent variation 
that is due to unmeasured but systematic causes (what we are calling productivity) or un-
measured, unsystematic causes (what can be called chance or caprice); we assume the lat-
ter is negligible and inseparably confounded with real productivity in legitimate salary 
decision-making. 
12. There was also disagreement regarding how to group individuals. The original commit-
tee chose task similarities and based the groups on different departments. We accepted 
the limitation of the data (human resources did not list specialties within departments) 
and attempted to group individuals by department types. We consciously chose not to 
use market force groupings (groupings based on published data that grouped individu-
als based on similar pay ranges for type of work performed) because of gender bias in the 
market that differentially rewards different types of employment (comparable worth is-
sues). Even the committee’s task-based departmental grouping confounds similarity of 
task with proportion female in the departments (e.g., by grouping pediatric departments 
together). However, administration was very aware of how market forces influence sal-
ary setting and felt it was not fair to penalize one institution that is at the mercy of world-
wide market forces. Thus, the administration considered the original model inadequate 
because it did not use market forces to group faculty. Ultimately the later committee and 
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the administration agreed to use published salary data to group individuals by medical 
specialty regardless of departmental affiliation. With considerable help from the admin-
istration, we were able to get this specialty information for all employees and to add it to 
the personnel data. 
13. When values of measure are arbitrary (as in a 0/1 dummy variable for gender), the dif-
ference in slopes between the two models implies a different intercept as well (the dis-
tance between two nonparallel lines will vary depending on where the y-axis is set). 
14. In fact, some differences (those due to race and age particularly) are also illegal and ille-
gitimate, but for the purposes of assessing gender-based inequities, they need to be exam-
ined separately (that is, statistically controlled), as well as examined for interaction effects 
with gender (none was significant). 
15. Gray (1990) considers a model explaining more than 70 percent of the variance to be ac-
ceptable, in that the size of the gap is not being inflated by a generally poor specification 
of the variables. Although the specific number is only an arbitrary convention, like the .05 
level for statistical significance, it reflects a general principle of seeking a good fit before 
turning to examination of the residual. 
16. In fact, Hauser recommends only running the regression with gender as a variable, but 
although this method is subsumed in ours, it is less useful because it provides no infor-
mation to examine the nature of the average difference, as the analysis of residuals does. 
17. This small group/individual prejudice approach is also closer to the way variables are 
controlled in experimental designs (Campbell and Stanley 1963) and also may appeal to 
physicians and other clinical researchers for this reason. The earlier studies at the Health 
Center that faculty women carried out also tended to employ comparison grouping and 
analysis of variance rather than multivariate statistical controls. 
18. The data for setting market-based values on departments were drawn from the Amer-
ican Association of Medical Colleges Report on Medical School Faculty Salaries (Smith, 
1993-1994) and the American Association of Dental Schools (i993-1994) Faculty Salary 
Survey. 
19. These figures reflect all of the adjustments made up to this point, not just those recom-
mended by the joint council. 
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